This is also far-fetched given that any technology transfer program would occur with public knowledge and at the very least an Indian notification. U.S. assurances that the assembly has peaceful purposes should be enough to deter any Indian response. It is also unclear as to why India would perceive the assembly as any more dangerous than Pakistans status quo nuclear policies. Pakistan has a First Use policy in which it will consider being the state to ratchet up a conventional war to the nuclear level (Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini). It has also clearly defined under what conditions it would use nuclear weapons, and short of the transfer program occurring during an India-Pakistan war India is unlikely to perceive the reassembly as a veiled threat to use the weapons (Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini).

Addressing this concern is simply a matter of constructing the transfer program in a way that is sensitive to Indias interests and perspectives. Solutions might include giving PALS to both India and Pakistan simultaneously, diplomatic assurances to India about the nature of the program, or timing the program so that it occurs during a period of relatively low hostilities.

Another objection made is that the United States would damage its credibility abroad in deterring proliferation by being seen as cooperating with Pakistans nuclear weapons program (Limaye). By openly cooperating with Pakistan, this argument holds that we would be legitimating their nuclear program and would send a signal to other states that there would be few, if any, consequences to developing nuclear weapons.